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CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
FILED 
Mary Noonan 
Office of the Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: State v. Salas, Case No. 900418-CA 
MAY 1F1991 
MaryT Noonan 
Clerk of tits Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
This letter of supplemental authority is being sent pursuant 
to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to advise this 
Court that the Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit reversed its 
earlier ruling in United States v. De Leon-Revna -F.2d-, (April 17, 
1991), 1991 WL 55881. The State is advising this Court of the 
reversal because the earlier ruling was relied upon by defendant at 
pages 15 and 16 of his brief. The State also referred to the case 
on page 10 and in footnote 2 of its brief. 
A copy of the new decision is attached to this letter. 
Very truly yours, 
lith S. H. Atherton 
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UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Mario DE LEON-REYNA, Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 89-2157. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit. 
April 17, 1991. 
Defense motion to suppress evidence seized by border patrol agent following 
warrantless investigatory stop of welding truck was granted by the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, George P. Kazen, J., 
and Government appealed. The Court of Appeals, 898 F.2d 486, affirmed, but, at 
908 F.2d 1229, ordered rehearing en banc on its own motion. The Court of 
Appeals held that: (1) incorrect information received by agent over radio 
indicating that license on welding truck had not been issued to truck could be 
considered in determining whether good-faith exception to exclusionary rule 
applied, and (2) it was objectively reasonable for officer to conclude that 
stop was lawful, and thus, good-faith exception to exclusionary rule applied. 
Reversed and remanded. 
King, Circuit Judge, filed opinion concurring in judgment. 
COPR. (C) WEST 1991 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
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Thornberry, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting opinion with which Johnson, 
Circuit Judge, joined and Politz, Circuit Judge, joined in part. 
Politz, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting opinion. 
COPR. (C) WEST 1991 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
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k. Arrest or search disclosing new offense. 
C.A.5 (Tex.) 1991. 
Regardless of whether border patrol agent was negligent in failing to follow 
his unit's code word policy on transmitting license number over radio, his 
good-faith reliance on incorrect license information indicating that plates on 
welding truck had been issued to an older dump truck was objectively 
reasonable, and thus, such information could be considered in determining 
whether there existed reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle on suspicion of 
smuggling, and also in applying good-faith exception to exclusionary rule, if 
stop were not justified; experienced dispatcher made no request to agent to 
repeat what he had said or use phonetics for letters, and dispatcher testified 
that officers often did not follow policy when transmitting license plate 
numbers. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
U.S. v. DE LEON-REYNA 
F.2d , 1991 WL 55881 (5th Cir.(Tex.)) 
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k. Grounds or cause for stop, search, or seizure. 
C.A.5 (Tex.) 1991. 
Regardless of whether border patrol agent was negligent in failing to follow 
his unit's code word policy on transmitting license number over radio, his 
good-faith reliance on incorrect license information indicating that plates on 
welding truck had been issued to an older dump truck was objectively 
reasonable, and thus, such information could be considered in determining 
whether there existed reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle on suspicion of 
smuggling, and also in applying good-faith exception to exclusionary rule, if 
stop were not justified; experienced dispatcher made no request to agent to 
repeat what he had said or use phonetics for letters, and dispatcher testified 
that officers often did not follow policy when transmitting license plate 
numbers. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
U.S., v. De Leon-Reyna 
F.2d , 1991 WL 55881 (5th Cir.(Tex.J) 
COPR. (C) WEST 1991 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
F.2d R 1 OF 46 P 5 OF 45 CTA5 P 





C.A.5 (Tex.) 1991. 
Border patrol agent's decision to pull welding truck over was not unreasonable 
in face of all surrounding circumstances, including his good-faith reliance on 
incorrect information received over radio that welding truck plates had been 
issued to another vehicle, and thus, good-faith exception to exclusionary rule 
applied; road was commonly used by drug traffickers and was about 30 or 40 
miles from Mexican border, border patrol reference manual warned of smuggling 
efforts via false compartments in plywood cargo, welding truck was carrying 
plywood, and driver appeared nervous. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
U.S. v. De Leon-Reyna 
F.2d , 1991 WL 55881 (5th Cir.(Tex.)) 
COPR. (C) WEST 1991 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
F.2d R 1 OF 46 P 6 OF 45 CTA5 P 




k. Grounds or cause for stop, search, or seizure. 
C.A.5 (Tex.) 1991. 
Border patrol agent's decision to pull welding truck over was not unreasonable 
in face of all surrounding circumstances, including his good-faith reliance on 
incorrect information received over radio that welding truck plates had been 
issued to another vehicle, and thus, good-faith exception to exclusionary rule 
applied; road was commonly used by drug traffickers and was about 30 or 40 
miles from Mexican border, border patrol reference manual warned of smuggling 
efforts via false compartments in plywood cargo, welding truck was carrying 
plywood, and driver appeared nervous. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
U.S. v. De Leon-Reyna 
F.2d , 1991 WL 55881 (5th Cir.(Tex.)) 
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k. Arrest, search incidental to; validity of arrest. 
C.A.5 (Tex.) 1991. 
Good-faith exception to exclusionary rule applies to warrantless arrests. 
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
U.S. v. De Leon-Reyna 
F.2d , 1991 WL 55881 (5th Cir.(Tex.J) 
COPR. (C) WEST 1991 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
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k. Arrest, search incidental to; validity of arrest. 
C.A.5 (Tex.) 1991. 
Good-faith exception to exclusionary rule applies to cases in which police 
officer errs, but nevertheless maintains good faith and objectively reasonable 
belief that he has adequate foundation to make a stop. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 
4. 
U.S. v. De Leon-Reyna 
F.2d , 1991 WL 55881 (5th Cir.(Tex.)) 
COPR. (C) WEST 1991 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
F.2d R 1 OF 46 P 9 OF 45 CTA5 P 
(CITE AS: 1991 WL 55881 (5TH CIR.(TEX.))) 
Jeffrey A. Babcockf Paula C. Offenhauser# Asst. U.S. Attys., Henry K. Oncken, 
U.S. Atty., Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant. 
Timothy L. Jackson, Houston, Tex., for defendant-appellee. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas. 
Before CLARK, Chief Judge, THORNBERRY, POLITZ, KING, JOHNSON, GARWOOD, JOLLY, 
HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS, JONES, SMITH, DUHE, WIENER and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges. 
PER CURIAM? 
*1 Today we decide whether the district court erred in granting a 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence gathered following a warrantless 
investigatory stop—a stop made partly in good faith reliance on information 
that was inaccurate through police error. A panel of our Court affirmed the 
district court, concluding that the vehicle stop violated the defendant's 
Fourth Amendment rights and further holding that "negligent" police conduct 
truncated the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. We now reconsider 
that decision en banc and reverse the district court. 
I. 
The facts are set forth in the panel opinion, 898 F.2d 486, to the extent that 
COPR. (C) WEST 1991 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
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they are not recounted here. On December 6, 1988, United States Border Patrol 
Agent Ernesto Martinez (Martinez), during routine patrol duty, parked his 
marked car on farm-to-market road 2050—a known alternative route of drug and 
alien smugglers seeking to avoid nearby Border Patrol checkpoints. [FN1] 
During his surveillance, he noticed a welding truck heading south, approaching 
his position. He was immediately struck by the truck's want of welding 
equipment—there were no tanks, arc welders, or metal hoses present in the 
truck, unlike welding trucks he had previously seen and inspected in the area. 
Instead, this truck contained a stack of plywood bound by metal straps, 
indicating that all of the plywood had been loaded at one time. The truck, 
however, had no pallets or other objects to create the holes needed for a 
forklift to load the cargo. The driver, defendant DE LEON-REYNA, appeared 
surprised and "scared" to see a Border Patrol agent. Furthermore, the truck 
bounced erratically and dragged a broken shock absorber, suggesting that the 
weight on the rear of the truck was very heavy. Agent Martinez also knew from 
reading a Border Patrol Intelligence Center reference book that stacks of 
plywood often concealed false compartments used for smuggling drugs and aliens. 
Suspicious, Agent Martinez then radioed the truck's license plate number "WM-
1438" to the dispatcher, who misunderstood him to say "WN-1438." The 
dispatcher acknowledged the message but owing to the error radioed back that 
the license check had revealed that the plates were issued to a 1973 Ford dump 
COPR. (C) WEST 1991 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
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truck and not the 1982 Chevrolet welding truck that Agent Martinez was 
following. 
Based on his observations and on the license check, Agent Martinez pulled the 
truck over. Agent Martinez inquired about the defendant's citizenship; and 
the defendant produced a resident alien card, volunteering that he was en route 
to a town down the road to do a construction job. When Agent Martinez asked 
the name of the town, however, the defendant replied that he had forgotten both 
it and the delivery address for the lumber. After additional questioning, 
Agent Martinez suspected that the defendant was lying. He asked permission to 
inspect the truck, and the defendant consented. Looking under the truck, Agent 
Martinez discovered a freshly welded, false compartment underneath its bed. 
After asking the defendant whether he knew if someone had tampered with the 
truck and receiving a negative response, he asked the defendant to step out of 
the car and produce a copy of his title. 
*2 Upon examining the title, Agent Martinez realized that the license check 
may have been inaccurate because the title matched the license plate on the 
truck. He radioed the dispatcher to run a second check and then radioed a 
border patrol agent at the nearby Freer checkpoint station, asking him to bring 
a drug sniffing dog to determine whether or not a search of the false 
compartment was necessary. The second license check gave Agent Martinez the 
correct information. When the dog arrived, it alerted to the rear of the 
COPR. (C) WEST 1991 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
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truck; Border Patrol agents later discovered over half a ton of cocaine in the 
false compartment. 
The United States indicted DE LEON-REYNA for possession with intent to 
distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. ss 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). He 
filed a motion to suppress the evidence, maintaining that Agent Martinez's 
initial stop was without a warrant or reasonable suspicion. During the 
district court's hearing on the motion to suppress, the dispatcher testified 
that it is her unit's policy to use code words for communicating license plate 
letters, although that policy is not always followed. In making his 
transmission on the occasion in question, Martinez did not use code words for 
the license plate letters. 
The district court granted the motion to suppress, concluding 
"that the Government cannot justify a stop based on erroneous information 
when the error is due to the negligence of its own employees. Once the 
putative false registration is removed from the picture, the remaining 
circumstances do not justify a stop," 
and that 
"[t]he Court does not question the good faith of the officers who made this 
stop, but as yet there is no precedent extending a good-faith exception to 
erroneous factual information relied upon by officers in making a warrantless 
stop. The Court thus concludes that it has no other recourse but to grant the 
COPR. (C) WEST 1991 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
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motion to suppress." 
The panel affirmed the district court. It conceded that "if the registration 
information provided over the radio was correct, then sufficient foundation for 
a brief investigatory stop existed." Id. at 488. However, the panel noted 
that the government conceded that "Martinez was negligent for failing to follow 
proper radio procedures," and held that accordingly the registration 
information could be given no consideration whatever in determining whether 
-there was an articulable, objective basis for the stop. Id. at 488-89. 
Concluding that the other circumstances did not justify the stop, the panel 
iield that the stop violated defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. The panel 
then turned to "the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule," under 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), and 
United States y. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc), cert, 
denied, 449 U.S. 1127, 101 S.Ct. 946, 67 L.Ed.2d 114 (1981). Although the 
panel recognized that "this circuit applies the [good faith] exception to 
warrantless searches," 898 F.2d at 491, it held that Martinez's negligent 
failure to follow his unit's code word policy precluded reliance on that 
exception, notwithstanding that "Martinez's mistake was made in good faith." 
Id-
II. 
*3 [1] We conclude that regardless of whether Martinez was negligent in 
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failing to follow his unit's code word policy, his good faith reliance on the 
license report information, as forming a part of the total circumstances he 
-evaluated in determining whether to stop the vehicle, was objectively 
reasonable, and that accordingly the district court and the panel erred in 
Jiolding that this information could be given no consideration whatever in 
evaluating whether the stop was justified under the reasonable suspicion 
standard of United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 
£21 (1981). [FN2] For the same reason, we also conclude that the district 
court and the panel erred in holding that the failure to follow the code word 
policy precluded reliance on the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 
In Fourth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court begins with the basic premise 
that, when examining whether an officer's judgment is objectively reasonable, 
"the essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the 
circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into account." Cortez, 101 
JS.Ct. at 695. The most recent affirmation of this principle is to be found in 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, — U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990), 
-where the Supreme Court found no Fourth Amendment violation when police had 
made a warrantless search of an apartment based on their reasonable belief that 
they had a valid consent to do so, when in fact they did not. The officers in 
Rodriguez, had interviewed an assault complainant who referred to the 
defendant's apartment as "our apartment" and also possessed a key to the 
COPR. (C) WEST 1991 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
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apartment. Id. 110 S.Ct. at 2797. Without further inquiry, the police 
searched the defendant's apartment and discovered substantial quantities of 
cocaine. Id. The officers never sought an arrest warrant or a search warrant 
and only later discovered that the complainant had no common authority over the 
apartment but in the past had been a somewhat infrequent visitor only. Id. 
The Supreme Court held that—despite the officers' failure to obtain a warrant 
or to make further inquiries as to who had a possessory interest in the 
apartment—the search would be valid if the officers' belief that they had 
consent, in light of all the circumstances, was objectively reasonable. See 
id. at 2801. See also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 
L.Ed.2d 72 (1987); Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 
484 (1971). 
Similarly, the issue here is not whether Martinez should have followed his 
unit's code word policy, but rather whether his good faith reliance on the 
license plate report, along with the other circumstances, in determining to 
stop the defendant's truck, was objectively reasonable. We do not view the 
code word policy as being constitutionally mandated or as establishing a 
constitutional minimum for reliability. Moreover, the policy plainly does not 
have the force of law, and there is nothing to suggest that it is even written, 
much less published. There is no showing that it is designed to do anything 
more than enhance the reliability of communications. However, this does not 
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suggest that all communications otherwise received are wholly unreliable. 
Hypothetically, on a scale of 1 to 100, a code word initiated report might have 
a reliability factor of 85, and one where code words are not utilized a 
reliability factor of only 65. While such a disparity would support the 
advisability of a code word policy, it would not mean that a report received 
where the policy had not been followed is so unreliable that it may not 
reasonably be given any consideration whatever. Obviously, this is not an "all 
or nothing" proposition for those acting in good faith. 
*4 Under the totality of the facts and circumstances present here, an 
objective officer situated as was Martinez could have reasonably relied on the 
license plate report information. Officer Martinez testified that he got up 
close to the back of defendant's truck so that he could clearly see the tag and 
carefully spoke the letters and numbers into his radio transmitter. The 
experienced dispatcher—thirteen years on the job—obviously thought she 
understood the transmission. She made no request to Martinez to repeat what he 
had said or to use phonetics for letters. At the receiving end of the 
dispatcher's responsive transmission, Martinez had no basis for thinking she 
had had any problem in understanding the tag number as he gave it. The 
dispatcher testified that officers often did not follow the policy procedures 
when transmitting license plate numbers. [FN3] 
We conclude that in this setting an objectively reasonable officer could 
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properly rely on the license report information/ notwithstanding that he knew 
it was obtained without the use of code words/ as forming a part of the total 
circumstances to be evaluated in determining whether there existed the 
requisite reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. Accordingly/ although the 
license plate information turned out to be erroneous, it nevertheless may not 
be disregarded in determining either the legality of the stop or the 
availability of the good faith exception. 
III. 
[2][3] Under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, "evidence is 
not to be suppressed ... where it is discovered by officers in the course of 
actions that are taken in good faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken, 
belief that they are authorized." Williams, 622 F.2d at 840. In our Circuit/ 
the good faith exception applies to warrantless arrests. See id. at 840 n. 1. 
The exclusionary rule is "neither intended nor able to 'cure the invasion of 
the defendant's rights which he has already suffered' " but rather "operates 
as 'a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights 
generally through its deterrent effect....' " Leon, 104 S.Ct. at 3412. The 
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule must in turn be balanced with the 
"substantial social cost" the rule imposes. Id. In Leon, the Supreme Court 
noted that: 
"[particularly when law enforcement officers have acted in objective good 
COPR. (C) WEST 1991 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
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faith or their transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit 
conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal 
justice system." Id. (emphasis added). 
[4] Concluding that the good faith exception applies to cases in which a 
police officer errs, but nevertheless maintains a good faith and objectively 
reasonable belief that he has an adequate foundation to make a stop, we now 
examine whether Agent Martinez's concededly good faith belief was an 
objectively reasonable one. For the reasons previously stated, in making this 
determination we consider the license report information received by Martinez, 
albeit discounting it somewhat because he was charged with knowledge that it 
might not be as reliable as it would have been if the code word policy had been 
followed. 
*5 The Supreme Court has stated that "officers on roving patrol may stop 
vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together with 
rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion" that a 
vehicle harbors contraband. United States v. Brignoni-Poncef 422 U.S. 873/ 95 
S.Ct. 2574/ 2582/ 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (discussing searches for illegal 
aliens); see also Cortez# 101 S.Ct. at 695-97. 
Here we determine that it was objectively reasonable for an officer in Agent 
Martinez's position to conclude that under all the circumstances there was a 
particularized and objective basis for reasonable suspicion that defendant's 
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vehicle was engaged in criminal activity—in other words, that a stop of the 
vehicle was lawful under the standards of Cortez and Brignoni-Ponce. 
Martinez's decision to pull the truck over—including his good faith reliance 
on the license plate information—was not unreasonable in the face of all of 
the surrounding circumstances: the road's common use by drug traffickers and 
close proximity to the border; the Border Patrol reference manual warning of 
smuggling efforts via false compartments in plywood cargo; the incongruity of 
the truck and the cargo it carried; and his evaluation of the circumstances 
and defendant's conduct, based on four years of experience in the same area of 
Texas. [FN4] His reliance on the license plate check is all the more 
unexceptionable given the district court's acknowledgement that a "license 
plate switcheroo" is not uncommon in smuggling cases. 
Indeed, we are inclined to believe that the stop of defendant's vehicle fully 
complied with the Cortez standard and was hence lawful. But even if we were to 
ultimately conclude that the circumstances fall marginally short of Cortez 's 
requirements, nevertheless it is abundantly clear that it would have been 
objectively reasonable for an experienced, well-trained police officer in this 
setting to conclude that those requirements were satisfied and that the stop 
was hence legal. Cf. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 
3039-41, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Accordingly, the "good faith" exception to the 
exclusionary rule is applicable, and the district court erred in granting the 
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motion to suppress. [FN5] 
Conclusion 
Agent Martinez's failure to comply with his unit's code word policy is not of 
itself the determinative issue in this case, nor is the question of whether in 
some sense or for some purpose that failure may be characterized as negligent. 
And, it is not determinative that the license plate information ultimately 
turned out to be wrong, just as it is not determinative that Agent Martinez's 
suspicion ultimately turned out to be well founded. What is determinative is 
that it was objectively reasonable for an experienced officer in Martinez's 
position to take the license plate information into account as forming part of 
the total circumstances to be evaluated and relied on in determining that there 
was reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, and that in doing so Martinez 
acted in good faith. This being the case, the license plate information 
relayed to Martinez may not be wholly disregarded, but on the contrary must be 
taken into account (albeit discounted somewhat for lessened reliability 
attendant on the means of communication employed), in judging both whether the 
stop was indeed lawful and also whether, for purposes of the good faith 
exception, it would be objectively reasonable for a similarly situated, 
experienced officer to conclude that the stop was lawful. Taking the license 
plate information thus into account, we hold that it would be objectively 
reasonable for an experienced officer, situated as was Martinez, to conclude 
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that there was adequate reasonable suspicion under the Cortez standard and that 
it was hence lawful to stop the vehicle. Thus, the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule is applicable and the evidence should not have been 
suppressed. 
*6 The district court's order granting defendant's motion to suppress is 
reversed and the cause is remanded. 
REVERSED and REMANDED. 
KING, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: 
As Judge Thornberry's thoughtful dissent points out, the rationale employed by 
the majority to reach the conclusion that the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule applies in this case also supports the conclusion that the 
stop in this case met the "reasonableness" requirement of the fourth amendmentf 
and I would decide the case on the latter basis. The Supreme Court's cases on 
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule (which post-date our Williams 
decision) feature an external source, e.g., a warrant or a statute, on which 
the officer could rely. Because it is unnecessary to do so in this case, I see 
no need to extend those cases to the stop at issue here, which does not contain 
such a source. I therefore concur in the judgment. 
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THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge, with whom JOHNSON, Circuit Judge, joins dissenting. 
Officer Ernie Martinez negligently transmitted a vehicle's license plate 
number, received an erroneous registration report because of his negligence, 
and then stopped the vehicle partially because of the erroneous registration 
information. The majority holds that the district court erred in refusing to 
include the registration information as a factor in determining whether Officer 
Martinez had a reasonable suspicion that the welding truck was transporting 
narcotics, but then pretermits the legality of the stop and applies the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule to hold that the district court erred 
in suppressing the cocaine which was discovered in the truck. My objection to 
both holdings is identical: erroneous information created by the negligent 
conduct of a law enforcement officer cannot be used to support a finding that 
the officer acted reasonably. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
I. 
To better comprehend my position and the position of the majority, it is 
helpful to understand the genesis of this appeal. At issue is the suppression 
of 1200 pounds of cocaine. Nevertheless, from the beginning, this case has 
been poorly prosecuted by the government. [FN1] The district court found that 
Officer Martinez acted negligently when he transmitted the welding truck's 
license plate number because he did not use a word designation for the letters 
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on the plate. [FN2] See District Court Memorandum and Order at 2, Record on 
Appeal, vol. 1, tab 16. Rather than appeal the finding that Officer Martinez's 
conduct was negligent, the government conceded it. See En Banc Brief for the 
United States at 25. 
The majority repeatedly attempts to slip out of the "negligence" label to 
which the government has yoked it. Its first tactic is to ignore the finding 
of negligence and focus on the word designation policy itself, arguing that 
the "code word policy [is not] constitutionally mandated," "does not have the 
force of law," and "is [not] even written, much less published." See Majority 
Opinion slip opinion at , at p. . Then, without any foundation in the 
record, it disparages transmissions in which word designations are used, 
hypothesizing them to be only eighty-five percent reliable and only twenty 
percent more reliable than transmissions in which the word designations are not 
used. See id. These arguments are specious. The codification and reliability 
of the border patrol's communication policy are only relevant in determining 
whether Officer Martinez was negligent when he failed to follow that policy. 
The government conceded that he was. Therefore, because we must accept the 
finding that Martinez was acting unreasonably when he neglected to use the word 
designation policy, the fourth amendment and the good faith exception required 
him to follow that policy. 
*7 The second tactic that the majority uses to throw off the negligence 
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yoke is to surreptitiously challenge its factual constitution: Officer 
Martinez "got up close to the back of" the truck and "carefully spoke the 
letters and numbers into his radio"; the dispatcher with thirteen years of 
experience thought that she understood the transmission, and Martinez had no 
reason to believe that she had not understood it; and "officers often did not 
follow the policy procedures when transmitting license plate numbers." [FN3] 
See id. slip opinion at , at p. . But the reasonableness of the 
officer's decision not to use word designations for the letters is not an issue 
on appeal; the district court found, and the government conceded, that a 
reasonable officer in Martinez's position would have used word designations. 
The second inexplicable blunder by the government was to tie the suppression 
of 1200 pounds of cocaine to the fate of the license registration report. As 
the majority points out, a number of peculiar things about the truck aroused 
Officer Martinez's suspicions before he ran a check on the truck's license 
plates. First, smugglers frequently used the road on which the truck was 
traveling, FM 2050, to avoid a border patrol checkpoint. [FN4] Second, the 
welding truck did not have welding equipment in it but was filled with plywood, 
and Officer Martinez had read training manuals which indicated that plywood was 
often used to create hidden compartments for smuggling drugs. [FN5] Third, the 
defendant, Mario DE LEON-REYNA, appeared nervous and became rigid when he 
passed Martinez's marked patrol car; he did not acknowledge Martinez's 
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presence as residents of that area usually did. Finally, after pulling behind 
the truck, Officer Martinez noticed that it appeared to be carrying a very 
heavy load, that it was bouncing erratically, and that it was dragging a shock 
absorber. [FN6] Considering the low threshold for the kinds of observations 
that will justify an investigatory stop near the border, Officer Martinez may 
have had sufficient reason to stop the truck even without the erroneous license 
plate information. [FN7] See United States v. Muniz-Ortega, 858 F.2d 258, 260 
(5th Cir.1988) (holding that border patrol agent had reasonable suspicion to 
stop a flat-bed truck near the border after noticing mud on the tires and lower 
parts of the truck, seeing the driver look at him and then immediately turn his 
head back toward the road, and noticing debris and scratches on the truck). 
[FN8] 
But the government never attempted to argue that the circumstances apart from 
the registration information justified an investigatory stop. See United 
States v. DE LEON-REYNA, 898 F.2d 486, 488-89 (1990), rev'd, slip opinion 
at , F.2d (5th Cir.1991) (en banc). The majority overcomes the 
government's carelessness through a sophistic use of the "totality of the 
circumstances" test of United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 
690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981): if one considers the other suspicious 
activity that Officer Martinez perceived, he was reasonable in relying on the 
erroneous registration report, even though it was the product of his negligent 
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conduct. See Majority Opinion slip opinion at , at p. . Officer 
Martinez's conduct was "negligent," however, only if he failed to act as a 
reasonable person would under similar circumstances. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, 
R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts s 32, at 175 
(Lawyer's 5th ed. 1984). Thus, the district court already considered the 
"totality of the circumstances" and concluded that Officer Martinez was 
negligent. Moreover, as I will explain below, the "totality of the 
circumstances" cannot be used to produce "reasonable reliance" from 
"unreasonable behavior." 
*8 Therefore, despite its obfuscation, the majority is defending the 
following proposition: that information obtained through unreasonable means 
can make a law enforcement officer's suspicions, or his "good faith" belief 
about those suspicions, more reasonable. 
II. 
A. The Good Faith Exception 
The "good faith" exception is a misnomer. The key to determining whether the 
exception applies is not whether the officer acted in "good faith" but whether 
the officer's actions were objectively reasonable. See United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 924, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3421, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (noting that the 
good faith exception turns on objective reasonableness). Officer Martinez's 
conduct in failing to use the word designations was negligent and, therefore, 
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not objectively reasonable. [FN9] 
The majority attempts to separate Martinez's conduct from his state of mind by 
arguing that Martinez did not have to be objectively reasonable in acquiring 
the information as long as he was objectively reasonable in believing the 
information after he received it. This premise makes no sense, however, when 
one considers that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to affect the future 
conduct of law enforcement officers. See id. at 920, 104 S.Ct. at 3420. See 
also Horton v. California, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2308-09, 110 L.Ed.2d 
112 (1990) (noting that "evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the 
application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that 
depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer"). 
The Supreme Court has consistently said that one of the purposes of the 
exclusionary rule is to deter negligent conduct by law enforcement officers. 
It has done so by reiterating the statement, first made in Michigan v. Tucker, 
417 U.S. 433, 447, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2365, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974), that H[t]he 
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police 
have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has 
deprived the defendant of some right" (emphasis added). [FN10] Furthermore, in 
every case in which the Court has allowed evidence to be admitted under either 
the good faith exception or the fourth amendment, it has found every aspect of 
the law enforcement agents' conduct to be objectively reasonable. [FN11] 
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Therefore, if an officer forms his belief based on information generated by his 
own actions, both his actions and his belief must be reasonable. The Supreme 
Court so noted in Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 
L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), the companion case to Leon. 
In Sheppard, police discovered a woman's badly burned body in a vacant lot and 
suspected Osborne Sheppard, one of her boyfriends, of having killed her. See 
id. at 984, 104 S.Ct. at 3425. They wanted to obtain a warrant to search 
Sheppard's home, but it was Sunday, and all they could find was a form 
authorizing a search for controlled substances. Nevertheless, they filled this 
out and brought it to a magistrate. They told the magistrate about the 
problem, and he purported to correct it. See id. at 985-86, 104 S.Ct. at 3426-
27. Under the auspices of the amended warrant, the police searched Sheppard's 
residence and found numerous incriminating pieces of evidence. See id. at 
987 & n. 4, 104 S.Ct. at 3427 & n. 4. 
*9 At his trial, Sheppard moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the 
"corrected" warrant still failed to conform to the fourth amendment because it 
did not adequately describe the things to be seized. The Supreme Court noted 
that the warrant was constitutionally defective, see id. at 988 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 
at 3427 n. 5, but held that the evidence was admissible under the good faith 
exception. 
[T]he police conduct in this case clearly was objectively reasonable and 
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largely error-free. An error of constitutional dimensions may have been 
committed with respect to the issuance of the warrant, but it was the judge, 
not the police officers, who made the critical mistake. M[T]he exclusionary 
rule was adopted to deter unlawful searches by police, not to punish the errors 
of magistrates and judges." 
Id. at 990, 104 S.Ct. at 3429 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 265, 
103 S.Ct. 2317, 2346, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (White, J., concurring)). 
The good faith exception only applies if the law enforcement officer has acted 
reasonably. No doctrinal basis exists for bifurcating Martinez's actions from 
his state of mind. 
B. The "Reasonableness" Requirement of the Fourth Amendment and That of the 
Good Faith Exception 
Although the majority holds that Officer Martinez could have based his 
suspicions about the welding truck on the erroneous registration information, 
it explicitly refuses to decide whether the stop violated the fourth 
amendment. See Majority Opinion slip opinion at n. 5, at p. . 
Rather, it reaches the conclusion that the good faith exception permits the 
cocaine to be admitted as evidence at DE LEON-REYNA'S trial. 
The structure of the majority's analysis is curious for two reasons. First, 
as noted above, Officer Martinez's observations may have satisfied the fourth 
amendment even without the erroneous registration report. If, as the majority 
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holds, we are permitted to add the erroneous report to those observations, the 
officer clearly had a reason to suspect that the truck was involved in criminal 
activity, and, therefore, the stop was legal. 
Second, under the facts of this case, the fourth amendment is equipollent to 
the good faith exception, i.e., Officer Martinez could not have met the 
"reasonableness" requirement for the good faith exception without meeting the 
"reasonableness" requirement of the fourth amendment. Under the fourth 
amendment, Officer Martinez was justified in stopping DE LEON-REYNA if his 
suspicions were reasonable; the good faith exception applies if he was 
reasonable in believing that he had a reasonable suspicion to stop DE LEON-
Reyna. If a mistake is made by someone other than the law enforcement officer, 
it is possible for the officer to be reasonable in believing that he is 
justified in stopping a defendant even though the basis for his suspicions is 
not objectively reasonable, but when the officer is also the one who made the 
mistake, the "reasonableness" required by the good faith exception is identical 
to the reasonableness required by the fourth amendment. Adding a "good faith" 
analysis to a fourth amendment analysis contributes nothing but confusion. Cf. 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 
(1989) ("We think the Court of Appeals' effort to refine and elaborate the 
requirements of "reasonable suspicion" in this case create [sic] unnecessary 
difficulty in dealing with one of the relatively simple concepts embodied in 
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the Fourth Amendment.") Two cases illustrate this point: Illinois v. 
Rodriguez, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) and Hill v. 
California, 401 U.S. 797, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971), 
*10 In Illinois v. Rodriguez, police officers searched the defendant's 
apartment after receiving the consent of a woman whom they mistakenly believed 
had common authority over the premises. See 110 S.Ct. at 2797. Because the 
police officers were the ones who acquired the information upon which they 
based their right to search the apartment, the issue was whether the officers' 
conduct had satisfied "the 'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment." See id. at 2800. The Court held that the fourth amendment would 
be satisfied if the facts available to the officers would support an 
objectively reasonable belief that the woman had authority over the premises. 
See id. at 2801. [FN12] 
In Hill v. California, police investigating a robbery had probable cause to 
arrest Hill. See 401 U.S. at 799, 91 S.Ct. at 1108. They went to Hill's 
apartment, knocked on the door, and Miller opened it. The police arrested 
Miller, believing that he was Hill, and then searched the apartment, where they 
discovered a number of items that connected Hill to the robbery. Subsequently, 
Hill was prosecuted for the robbery, and he moved to suppress the items 
discovered in his apartment, arguing that police did not make a lawful arrest 
and, therefore, had no right to search the apartment. Noting that the 
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arresting officers had probable cause to arrest Hill, and that they had a 
reasonable good faith belief that Miller was Hill, the Court held that "the 
arrest and subsequent search were reasonable and valid under the Fourth 
Amendment.M See id. at 802, 804-05, 91 S.Ct. at 1110, 1111 (emphasis added). 
Therefore, because Officer Martinez made the mistake and also made the stop, 
if that mistake had been reasonable, as the majority asserts, the stop would 
have been legal under the fourth amendment. In fact, the majority's premise 
that there is a difference between its good faith exception and the fourth 
amendment is belied by the opinion itself. According to the majority, the 
fourth amendment is satisfied if Martinez's "good faith reliance on the license 
plate report, along with the other circumstances, in determining to stop the 
defendant's truck, was objectively reasonable." See Majority Opinion slip 
opinion at , at p. . The good faith exception is satisfied if "under 
all the circumstances there was a particularized and objective basis for 
reasonable suspicion that [the] defendant's vehicle was engaged in criminal 
activity." See id. slip opinion at , at p. . Under the facts of this 
case, I cannot discern a difference between these two tests. 
The majority does use slightly different language to distinguish its analysis 
of the fourth amendment from its analysis of the good faith exception: Officer 
Martinez was reasonable in relying on the erroneous license information under 
the fourth amendment if we consider the "totality of the circumstances," but he 
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was reasonable under the good faith exception if we consider "all the 
circumstances." Regardless of semantics, my objection to both arguments is 
identical: if the registration information was procured through unreasonable 
means9 it cannot be modified by other circumstances and used to justify the 
stop* 
C. A Reasonable Belief Cannot be the Product of Unreasonable Conduct Under 
Hither the Fourth Amendment or the Good Faith Exception 
*11 As explained in Part 11(A), the exclusionary rule requires that an 
officer's actions as well as his state of mind be objectively reasonable. In 
addition, the majority's attempt to use the "totality of the circumstances" in 
order to distinguish Martinez's actions from his state of mind is inherently 
illogical, whether it is done under the auspices of the fourth amendment or the 
exclusionary rule, because an actor's belief cannot be characterized as 
"reasonable" if it is grounded on facts produced by that actor's unreasonable 
conduct. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 
1-Ed.2d 660 (1979) (noting that the reasonableness standard requires "that the 
facts upon which an intrusion is based be capable of measurement against 'an 
objective standard' " ) . 
The "totality of the circumstances" approach is quantitative: it permits a 
court to add together individual facts known to law enforcement officers to 
determine whether the officers had a reasonable basis for suspecting that 
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someone was involved in a crime. For example, police may not have reasonable 
suspicion to detain someone based solely on an anonymous tip, but they could 
Jiave reasonable suspicion if that tip was corroborated by independent 
investigation. See Alabama v. White, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2417, 110 
Ii.Ed.2d 301 (1990). The problem with the license registration report, however, 
is qualitative: it is tainted by negligence. 
The majority disputes this: it argues that Officer Martinez's negligence 
simply diminishes the reliability of the report and, therefore, it should be 
discounted "somewhat." See Majority Opinion slip opinion at , at p. . 
But again, the fallacy in this analysis is illustrated by the majority's own 
argument. If, as the majority asserts, the only reason for "discounting" the 
registration report is that it was twenty percent less reliable than if Officer 
Hartinez had used word designations, why would not the license report itself 
justify the stop? Why modify it using the "additional circumstances"? After 
-all* if a law enforcement officer is sixty-five percent sure that a vehicle is 
operating with stolen license plates, he certainly would be reasonable in 
stopping the vehicle and asking to see its registration. 
The majority implicitly recognizes the qualitative defect of the registration 
report and does not attempt to defend its value independent of the other 
incriminating circumstances. Rather it asserts that Officer Martinez's 
"additional observations" made his tainted (unreasonable) reliance on the 
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erroneous license plate information reasonable, and that we can then combine 
the converted "unreasonable" reliance on the license plate with those same 
"additional observations" and conclude that Officer Martinez had a "reasonable" 
belief that DE LEON-REYNA was engaged in criminal activity. This type of 
reasoning is commonly disparaged with the epithet, bootstrapping. [FN13] 
If we assume that Officer Martinez would not have been objectively reasonable 
in believing that he could stop DE LEON-REYNA before receiving the erroneous 
registration information, adding an additional piece of information to the 
equation, obtained through unreasonable means, does not make his belief 
objectively reasonable. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 960, 104 S.Ct. at 3445-46 ("[A]n 
official search and seizure cannot be both 'unreasonabe' [sic] and 'reasonable' 
at the same time") (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Both the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule and the fourth amendment require that 
the officer's actions be objectively reasonable. Consequently, neither can be 
used to admit the evidence in this case. 
III. 
*12 I understand the majority's reluctance to suppress 1200 pounds of 
cocaine because the arresting officer failed to properly transmit a license 
plate number. Nevertheless, the touchstone for admitting that evidence under 
the fourth amendment and under the good faith exception is "objective 
reasonableness." Here, the district court held and the government conceded 
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that the officer was negligent and, therefore, by definition, unreasonable. 
Therefore, I do not believe that the registration information can be included 
as a factor in determining whether Officer Martinez had a reasonable suspicion 
-that the welding truck was engaged in criminal activity or that the good faith 
exception can be used to admit this evidence, and I respectfully dissent. 
POLITZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
I cannot join the majority for I cannot agree that there could be a good faith 
reliance by officer Martinez on information which, as factually found by the 
district court and conceded by the government, by definition was unreasonably 
acquired by the officer. If the posture of this case permitted, I would 
conclude that the officer's stop of the vehicle did not violate the fourth 
amendment. Because that resolution is not available, and because I cannot 
accord to the unreasonably acquired information the healing balm accorded by 
-the majority, I must respectfully dissent. In doing so, I join much of what 
Brother Thornberry has written in his dissent. 
FN1. Martinez was approximately thirty to forty miles from the Mexican 
border. In his four years with the Border Patrol prior to the defendant's 
arrest, Agent Martinez himself had apprehended illegal aliens on FM 2050 on 
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more than thirteen different occasions. FM 2050 is not well-traveled; 
only two other cars passed Agent Martinez in the hour and a half he was on 
duty before the defendant's truck appeared. 
FN2. Considering "the totality of the circumstances ... the detaining 
officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting" 
that the vehicle stopped is engaged in criminal activity, id. at 695, 
although this need not rise to the level of affording probable cause for 
arrest or search. Id. at 697. 
FN3. There was no contrary evidence. The only evidence concerning the 
policy was the dispatcher's testimony. 
FN4. All of the foregoing are valid considerations for making an 
investigatory stop. See Brignoni-Ponce, 95 S.Ct. at 2582. (The close 
proximity to the border, the traffic on the particular road, information 
and experience available to the officer, the driver's behavior, aspects of 
the vehicle itself—are all relevant factors in detecting illegal 
smuggling.) 
FN5. By ultimately resolving this case on the Leon-Williams exception to 
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the exclusionary rule, without determining that the stop violated the 
Fourth Amendment (indeed, as indicated, we conclude it likely did not), we 
do not imply that the district courts usually should not (or should) first 
resolve the substantive Fourth Amendment issue. Where there is an 
important unresolved substantive issue under the Fourth Amendment, it may 
often be preferable to reach that issue first, and only proceed to Leon-
Williams if the substantive issue is resolved against the validity of the 
challenged action (see Leon, 104 S.Ct. at 3421-22); whether or not it is 
also appropriate to proceed in that (or the opposite) fashion more 
generally, or whether the order of proceeding is better addressed on a case 
by case basis (cf. Leon, 104 S.Ct. at 3421), we leave till another day. 
FN1. After the panel issued its original opinion affirming the suppression 
of the evidence, the government did not file a petition for rehearing. 
FN2. The district court's determination that Officer Martinez was 
negligent is a finding of fact, which cannot be disturbed unless it is 
clearly erroneous. See In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport on 
August 2, 1985, 919 F.2d 1079, 1085 (5th Cir.1991). The dispatcher 
testified that proper police policy was to use word designations so that 
similar sounding letters would not be confused. See Record on Appeal, vol. 
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2, at 78. She also testified that communication in the area where Officer 
Martinez was following DE LEON-REYNA is particularly difficult. See id. 
slip opinion at , at p. . Therefore, the district court's finding 
is not clearly erroneous. 
FN3. That other officers failed to follow the word designation policy 
would not shield Officer Martinez from negligence. See, e.g., Helling v. 
Carey, 83 Wash.2d 514, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (1974) (en banc) (holding that 
defendants, ophthalmologists, were negligent as a matter of law for failing 
to administer a glaucoma test to a patient under age forty even though it 
was the practice of ophthalmologists never to test for glaucoma in patients 
younger than forty because only one in 25,000 of such patients would suffer 
from the disease). 
FN4. Compare United States v. Ortega-Serrano, 788 F.2d 299, 301-02 (5th 
Cir.1986) (holding that immigration agents did not have reasonable 
suspicion to stop a car driving between Fort Worth and Dallas because there 
was no testimony that the area was commonly used for smuggling or that this 
type of car was often used for smuggling). 
FN5. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695-
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96, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) (noting that "when used by trained law 
enforcement officers, objective facts, meaningless to the untrained, can be 
combined with permissible deductions from such facts to form a legitimate 
basis for suspicion of a particular person and for action on that 
suspicion"). See also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10, 109 S.Ct. 
1581, 1587, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (holding that law enforcement agent could 
form a reasonable suspicion based on observation that defendant's conduct 
was consistent with a "drug courier profile"); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491, 493 & n. 2, 502, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1322 & n. 2, 1326, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 
(1983) (holding that police officers had reasonable suspicion to detain an 
airline passenger whose characteristics fit "drug courier profile"); 
United States v, Hanson, 801 F.2d 757, 761-62 (5th Cir.1986) (reviewing 
officers' observations of defendant, which matched "drug courier profile," 
and finding that officers had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant, but 
noting that the match between the profile and the characteristics of the 
defendant did not, by itself, create reasonable suspicion). 
FN6. See United States v. Lopez-Gonzalez, 916 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th 
Cir.1990) (holding "that the fact that a vehicle appears to be heavily 
loaded is a factor that may properly weigh in favor of justification for a 
stop" (emphasis in original)). 
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FN7. If Martinez's observations, by themselves, would have made a 
reasonable person with his four years of experience suspicious that the 
welding truck was engaged in illegal activity, he did not violate the 
fourth amendment when he stopped DE LEON-REYNA'S truck. See Sokolow, 490 
U.S. at 7, 109 S.Ct. at 1585. This is true even if Officer Martinez 
testified that he would not have stopped the truck had he not received the 
erroneous information from the dispatcher. Courts use an objective 
touchstone to verify "reasonableness." See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 
U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2800 n. *, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990); Illinois v. 
Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 1170, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987). 
What Officer Martinez actually would have done once he acquired enough 
information to cross the fourth amendment's threshold of "reasonable 
suspicion" is irrelevant. 
FN8. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-86, 95 
S.Ct. 2574, 2582, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (listing some of the observations 
that may enkindle an officer's legitimate suspicions, including the 
"characteristics of the area in which [he] encounter[s] a vehicle," "[i]ts 
proximity to the border," the amount of traffic on the road, the driver's 
behavior, whether the vehicle looks as though it may have a secret 
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compartment, and whether the vehicle appears to be heavily loaded); United 
States v. Lopez, 911 F.2d 1006, 1009-10 (5th Cir.1990) (finding reasonable 
suspicion to stop a heavily loaded truck when border patrol agents 
intercepted CB communications which indicated that the truck was travelling 
with two other cars, and the driver of the truck decelerated when he saw 
the agents approach); United States v. Boruff, 909 F.2d 111, 117 (5th 
Cir.) (holding that border patrol agent who observed a car and a pickup 
truck traveling at the same speed, at approximately the same distance 
apart, on two consecutive days, and who observed the driver of the car 
communicating with the driver of the pickup, had reasonable suspicion to 
stop the car after the pickup was found to be smuggling marijuana), 
petition for cert, filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1990) (No. 90-
1055); United States v. Kohler, 836 F.2d 885, 888 (5th Cir.1988) (finding 
reasonable suspicion to stop a heavily loaded motor home near the border 
after park rangers had observed changes in the motor home and its driver); 
United States v. Gordon, 712 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that 
border patrol agents who observed an unfamiliar truck with a compartment 
underneath the bed had reasonable suspicion to stop the truck); United 
States v. Gandara-Nunez, 564 F.2d 693, 694-95 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that 
border patrol agents were justified in stopping a car which had a large 
trunk, was heavily loaded, and appeared to be evading marked border patrol 
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cars by accelerating and then turning onto a small street). Cf. Alabama v. 
White, — U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416-17, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 
(1990) (holding that police had reasonable suspicion to stop a woman's car 
based on an anonymous tip which accurately predicted that the woman would 
be leaving a particular apartment at a specific time and would be going to 
a particular motel, and which stated that the woman would be in possession 
of cocaine). 
FN9. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on 
Torts s 32, at 174-75 (Lawyer's 5th ed. 1984) (explaining that one's 
conduct is negligent if one fails to act as a reasonable person would in a 
similar situation). 
FN10. See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 191-92, 106 S.Ct. 477, 
495, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Leon, 468 U.S. at 
919, 104 S.Ct. at 3418; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 260, 103 S.Ct. 
2317, 2344, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 
539, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 2318, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975); Brown v. Illinois, 422 
U.S. 590, 612, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2266, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
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FN11. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2793, 
2800, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (holding that the fourth amendment is not 
violated if police officers reasonably believe that they have consent to 
enter the premises); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88, 107 S.Ct. 
1013, 1019, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987) (holding that the validity of a search 
based on a warrant that is too broad depends on whether the officers' 
failure to realize the overbreadth of the warrant was objectively 
understandable and reasonable); Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802, 91 
S.Ct. 1106, 1110, 28 L.Ed.2d 484 (1971) (holding that police were 
reasonable in believing that the person whom they arrested was a robbery 
suspect whom they had probable cause to arrest, and, therefore, search 
incident to that arrest was reasonable under the fourth amendment). See 
also United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc) 
(holding that the good faith exception applied when a narcotics agent 
reasonably believed that he had authority to arrest the defendant for 
violating a court order which required her to remain in Ohio), cert, 
denied, 449 U.S. 1127, 101 S.Ct. 946, 67 L.Ed.2d 114 (1981). 
FN12. The State court did not evaluate the reasonableness of the officers' 
belief, and, therefore, the case was remanded "for consideration of that 
question." See Illinois v. Rodriguez, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2801, 
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Ill L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). 
FN13. To illustrate the bootstrapping problem, assume that both the 
license plate information and the "additional circumstances" are necessary 
for Officer Martinez to form the reasonable belief required by the good 
faith exception. Therefore, if each of these pieces of information had a 
mathematical value of "1," we would need a "2" for the exception to be 
satisfied (1 + 1). The problem is that the erroneous license plate 
information is worth "0," and 1 + 0 does not equal 2. The majority argues 
.,„Q t-vi^  additional circumstances to change the 0 to a 1, or to 
